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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DAVID J. SMITH, FOR THE ESTATE
OF SALLIE L. SMITH, LORETTA E.,
SMITH, FIDDLERS CANYON
DEVELOPMENT, LTD., AND
TRADERS INTERNATIONAL
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Appeal No. 20070501
CEDAR CITY MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
UTAH CODE ANN.

§78-2a-3 and

UT.

R.

APP.

P. 3(a) provides this Court's

jurisdiction over this appeal from the Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
entered on April 14, 2007 (the "Dismissal Order"), by the Fifth Judicial District Court in
and for Iron County, State of Utah, in this case concerning the trial court's dismissal of an
Inverse Condemnation Action. A copy of the Dismissal Order is attached hereto as
Addendum "A" and incorporated herein by this reference.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE I: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to properly convert the
City's motion pursuant to UT. R. ClV. P. 12(b)(6) into a motion pursuant to
Ut. R. Civ. P. 56 for summary judgment, effectively failing to give Smith
reasonable notice or opportunity to submit other rule 56 materials before
granting the motion?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Whether the district court properly granted the motion
to dismiss is 'a question of law, [which] we review for correctness, giving no
deference to the decision of the trial court.9" Gunn v. Utah State Retirement Bd.,
2007 UT App. 4, Tf6, 155 P.3d 113, citing Peterson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2002 UT
App. 56, T[7, 42 P.3d 1253. "We will only affirm a trial court's grant of a motion to
dismiss ' "where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to
relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of its claims." ' "
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shores, 2006 UT 393, f 14, 147 P.3d 456, cftwg Heiner v, S.J.
Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107, 109-10 (Utah App. 1990)(quoting Arrow Indus. V.
Zions First Naf 1 Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). "In reviewing trial court
order granting motion to dismiss for failure to state claim on which relief can be
granted, appellate court must accept material allegations of complaint as true, and
appellate court will affirm trial court's ruling only if it clearly appears complainant
can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claims." Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2006
UT App 340, f 6, 143 P.3d 295.
ISSUE II:

Did the trial court violate Appellants' due process rights under the
United States and Utah Constitutions by first denying a motion to
consolidate the case with a separate cause pertaining to the real
property, then determining the underlying issue based upon the
determination in that separate cause of action?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Constitutional issues, including that of due process, are
questions of law which we review for correctness." State in Interest of K.M., 965 P.2d
576, 351 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, U 1.

ISSUE III:

Did the trial court commit plain error in relying in its decision to
dismiss the action upon the affidavit of Kit Wareham, Cedar City
Engineer, in which Wareham attested to provisions of a contract, a
copy of which was never provided by the City to the trial courf!

STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The admissibility of an item of evidence is a legal
question." Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 19, K 14, 17 P.3d 1110, citing Jensen v.
Intermountain Power Agency. 1999 UT 10,1fl2, 977 P.2d 474. "[T]he trial court has a
great deal of discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude evidence, and its
ruling will not be overturned unless there is an abuse of discretion." Id. , citing Jensen at
1H[12, 14; State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994); State v. Sutton, 707 P.2d 681,
684 (Utah 1985).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A.

Hintze's Utah Law of Eminent Domain, §11.15

B.

UTAH CONST. ART. I § 22

C.

UTAH CODE ANN.

17A-3-303(l)(a)

D.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78-34-9

E..

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78-34-10

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Cedar City (the "City") entered condemnation property (the "Property") sometime
in 1999 and began conducting soil tests. The City entered into a contract with Schmidt
Construction ("Schmidt") to build the Fiddlers' Canyon flood control structure, which
included a dam and retention basin (the "Structure"). Most of the materials used in
constructing the Structure were obtained onsite. The materials consisted of various size
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rock, some of which was used as riprap and some of which was processed in to various
size materials as specified in the contract.
At the time the contract was executed between the City and the contractor, Smith
was the owner of the Property. The City constructed and completed the Structure on the
Property in 2000. In 2001, more than a year after the Structure was completed, the City
commenced the related action in Cedar City v. Smith, et ah Civil No.010500168 DC (the
"Condemnation Action"), pertaining to the condemnation of the 7.5 acres that contains
the Structure.
The Condemnation Action sought title to the land involved but did not address the
rock and gravel removed and utilized in the Structure. Smith filed a counterclaim in the
Condemnation Action for inverse condemnation pertaining to the materials used in the
Structure in the Condemnation Action, but said counterclaim was dismissed for lack of
ripeness until the adjudication in that action resulted in a judgment not yielding just
compensation. See, Condemnation Action, Memorandum and Order, dated April 1, 2005.
On May 21, 2001, David J. Smith, for the Estate of Sallie L. Smith, Loretta E.,
Smith, Fiddlers Canyon Development, Ltd., and Traders International, (hereinafter
collectively, "Smith") filed a Complaint in the Fifth Judicial District Court, under Case
No. 010500355 for inverse condemnation pertaining to the rocks and materials that were
utilized in the building of the Structure prior to the condemnation of the Property by the
City (the "Inverse Action"). Both cases were set before the same trial court judge, Judge
G. Michael Westfall. The Complaint alleged in the first cause of action that Smith was
entitled to compensation for the materials used in the construction of the Special

Improvement District (hereinafter "SID") which was constructed on his property.
(Complaint, p. 3). In a second cause of action, Smith challenged the SID as invalid.
In 2005, after mediation with the City in the Condemnation Action, Smith deeded
to the City the Property upon which the Structure was built, but retained ownership of the
surrounding portion of the property.

No condemnation proceedings were ever

commenced by the City with respect to the rocks and materials removed from the
Property and surrounding areas to complete the Structure. Although scheduling of the
Inverse Action revolved around the Condemnation Action, and several extensions and
continuances were arranged and granted so that the Condemnation Action could resolve
prior to a determination on the Inverse Action, the trial court denied Smith's motion to
consolidate the cases.
This appeal stems from the dismissal of the Inverse Action. In an order dated June
9, 2006, a briefing schedule was set as to the pending causes of action1. (Stipulated Order
Vacating Trial; Dismissing Plaintiffs Second and Third Causes of Action, p.2). Id. On
or about July 31, 2006, Smith's Trial Brief'was filed indicating that, since the City had
used materials in the form of rock and gravel in the construction of a flood control
structure from the condemned property and adjacent property, that Smith was entitled to
just compensation. The Trial Brief also indicated that the SID that had been constructed
was invalid. (Trial Brief pp. 1-9).

1

Although the parties stipulated to a dismissal of the cause of action pertaining to the validity of the SID, the trial
court acknowledged that neither party referenced such stipulation and presented full argument on said issue in their
memoranda. Hence, the trial court opted to consider the claim in its final Judgment in this matter. See, Addendum
"A."
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On August 25, 2006, the City filed their Response to Plaintiffs' 'Trial Brief and
Motion to Dismiss, arguing estoppel, claim preclusion, and issue preclusion. The City
based their Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, supported by an affidavit sworn to by Kit Wareham. (Response to Plaintiffs'
u

Trial Brief' and Motion to Dismiss, pp. 1-16). Smith in turn filed the Plaintiffs Reply to

Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' "Trial Brief and Motion to Dismiss on September
12, 2006, which included a Statement of Facts supported by an affidavit sworn to by
Frank Nichols. (Reply to Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' "Trial Brief and Motion to
Dismiss, pp. 1-16). The City then filed a Motion to Strike certain portions of those facts
and Smith responded in turn with a Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Strike. (Motion to Strike, pp. 1-2; Response in Opposition of pp. 1-3). On October 3,
2006, the City filed a Reply relating to their Motion to Strike.
On November 13, 2006, the same court entered the Final Order of Condemnation
in the Condemnation Action. In a review hearing held in the instant matter on February
13, 2007, the City presented arguments to dismiss the Inverse Action based in part upon
entry of the final order in the Condemnation Action. On April 14, 2006, the trial court
entered the Dismissal Order, from which Smith now appeals. (Order Granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss pp. 1-4). The Dismissal Order dismissed Smith's Inverse
Action. Id. at 3. On May 14, 2007, Smith timely filed his Notice to Appeal from the
Dismissal Order. (Notice to Appeal p. 1).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

The Complaint

On May 24, 2007, Smith filed his Complaint in the above-captioned matter. In
said Complaint, Smith alleged that, on or about June 6, 1999, the City initiated SID-98,
which was a conglomeration of six (6) projects, each independent from the others and
with the assessments within each project segregated and grouped according to the
properties which purported to benefit from the work done within each project.

See,

Complaint at p. 2. One of the projects included in SID-98 was the flood control structure,
the construction materials of which are at issue in this Inverse Action. Id. The flood
control structure herein was designed and engineered by Bowen Collins & Associates, a
Salt Lake City engineering firm hired by the City, and the estimated cost was in excess of
two million dollars ($2,000,000.00). Id.
Sometime during the Fall of 1999, the City entered into a contract for the
construction of the flood control structure with Schmidt, who was the successful bidder
of the project. Id. The contract identified the City as the owner of the real property
where the flood control structure was to be built; however, the property was then owned
by the Smith parties herein. Id. The contract provided that Schmidt could enter the
property and construct the project using materials located on Smith's properties. Id.
Schmidt was ultimately paid $819,361.15 on the contract, with total cost of the
construction according to the City at $915,753.54 (including interest on interim
warrants). Id. On April 24, 2001, the City enacted an ordinance assessing plaintiffs
property. Id.
B.

Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May be
Granted.
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On October 3, 2006, Cedar City Engineer Kit Wareham ("Wareham"), swore in
an affidavit that he contracted with Schmidt Construction to construct the SID in the
instant matter. (Affidavit of Kit Wareham, Cedar City Engineer, p. 1).

Schmidt

Construction ("Schmidt") was hired to construct a flood control structure (hereinafter the
"Structure") within the SID. Id. The construction of the Structure required rip-rap lining
of the Structure's channel and rock lining for the dam and basin. Id. at 2. Wareham swore
that the contract with Schmidt required Schmidt to provide the rock and other materials
needed to construct the Structure and that, to the best of his knowledge, Schmidt did so.
Id
On September 25, 2006, managing partner of Fiddler's Canyon Development,
LTD., Frank Nichols (hereinafter "Nichols"), a party to the above captioned case, swore
by affidavit that the City entered the condemned property at issue herein and began to
conduct soil tests in 1999. (Affidavit of Frank Nichols in Support of Reply to Defendant's
Response to Plaintiffs' Trial Brief and Motion to Dismiss, p. 1). Nichols swore that, it was
at this time that the City resolved to build the Structure, using rock and gravel located onsite and from the adjacent property. Id. at 2. Nichols swore that the City completed the
Structure in 2000, and since that time levied assessments against the adjacent properties
for the SID. Id. Nichols swore that the City filed the Condemnation Action against Smith
in 2001, a year after the Structure was completed. Id. Nichols swore that during
proceedings for the Condemnation Action, the trial court "acknowledged in open court on
the record as William L. Bernard [counsel for Smith in the Condemnation Action and
herein] raised the issue and made statements several times in open court to the effect that

the Court was limiting the condemnation issue to the value of land upon which the
Structure was sited,55 which was 7.5 acres. Id. at pp. 2-3. Nichols swore that Smith did
not authorize the taking of the materials used in the construction of the Structure and that
compensation for the materials had not been provided to Smith. Id at 3.
The City moved to strike Frank Nichols' affidavit, alleging that it contained
unsupported claims and failure to assert a fact in one of the paragraphs. See, Motion to
Strike, dated September 14, 2006. In support of said motion, the City alleged that the
rocks were supplied by the private contractor, Schmidt, to satisfy their contract with the
City, to which Wareham's aforementioned affidavit pertains. See, Reply to Plaintiff's
Response to Defendant's Motion to Strike, dated October 3, 2006. The City further
alleged that the elusive contract not provided to the parties or the trial court in this matter,
". . .is explicit that the contractor is to furnish, 'all of the material, supplies, tools,
equipment, labor and other services necessary for the construction and completion of the
project described herein."9 Id. The City goes on to argue that, "[t]here is also a term in
the contract whereby Schmidt Construction agreed to hold the City harmless from, 'any
liability, damages or claims that may arise in the course of the Contractor, its agents or
employees performing any activities in connection with said project, or resulting through
negligence of the same.5" Id. The City then relies upon a deposition of Frank Nichols in
which they claim he indicated he had a verbal contract with Schmidt for at least some of
the materials used to construct the project. Id.
In the Dismissal Order in this matter, the trial court acknowledged the filing of the
motion to strike and the responses thereto, indicating that the City had supported its
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position with the Wareham's affidavit. See, Dismissal Order at pp. 2-3. Specifically, the
trial court indicated that, ". . .Wareham claims that the contractor on the project was
obligated to provide the materials and, in fact, did provide 'all the rocks used as materials
in the project that were not removed from the approximately 7.5 acre flood control basin
constructed as part of the project.' That claim is unrebutted by any affidavit or citation to
the record except the allegations of the Complaint and Plaintiffs' arguments against
dismissal." Id. at p. 3. The trial court then denied the claim respecting compensation for
materials located on the condemned property as failing to state a claim for which relief
may be granted, referencing Smith's compensation in the Condemnation Action as
inclusive of the materials taken from the condemned property. Id. As it pertained to
materials taken from adjacent properties, the trial court found that the claim was
unsupported by any affidavit or citation to the record, stating that ". . .Plaintiffs may not
simply rely on the allegations in their complaint or their argument, unsupported by any
affidavit or citation to the record, in opposing Defendant's motion for summary
judgement [sic] as to that claim." Id. The trial court then granted "Defendant's motion
for summary judgment of dismissal" as to the materials removed from adjacent property
and dismissed the claim. Id.
C.

Dismissal of Cause of Action Regarding Validity of SID.

In accordance with governing code sections, the Complaint was filed within the
requisite 30-day time frame from such assessment on May 24, 2007. See, UTAH CODE
ANN. §17A3-330. In the Complaint, the first cause of action was based in equity and
justice requesting compensation for the materials used in construction of the project in

the sum of one million dollars ($1,000,000.00), praying for judgment in the form of a
setoff to the aforementioned assessment. See, Complaint at p. 4. The second and third
causes of action, also based in equity and justice, challenged the validity of the
assessment as being against properties not benefited by the structure and inequitable as to
properties arbitrarily exempted from the assessment. Id.
Although the parties entered into a stipulation to dismiss the second and third
causes of action, the validity of the SID was briefed by both parties and the trial court
accordingly addressed the arguments of the parties as to such. See, Order Granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, dated April 14, 2007. In the City's Reply to Defendant's
Response to Plaintiffs' 'Trial Brief and Motion to Dismiss, the City argued for
dismissal based on the contention that ". . .plaintiffs [sic] have not alleged that they
complied with the above cited provisions of UCA §17A-3-330 [sic], that would allow
them to contest the assessment." Ibid, at p. 8. The action pertaining to the validity of the
SID was dismissed by the trial court on the basis that the Complaint failed to allege
compliance with the statutory provisions cited by the City in its Reply to Defendant's
Response to Plaintiffs' 'Trial Brief and Motion to Dismiss. Ibid, at pp. 3-4.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
UTAH CONST. ART. I

§ 22 states, "Private property shall not be taken or damaged

for public use without just compensation."
ARGUMENT
L THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO
PROPERLY CONVERT THE CITY'S MOTION PURSUANT TO UT. R. CIV. P.
12(B)(6) INTO A MOTION PURSUANT TO UT. R. CIV. P. 56 FOR SUMMARY
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JUDGMENT, EFFECTIVELY FAILING TO GIVE SMITH REASONABLE
NOTICE OR OPPORTUNITY TO SUBMIT OTHER RULE 56 MATERIALS
BEFORE GRANTING THE MOTION
A.

The Trial Court Failed to Convert the Dismissal Motion into a Motion
for Summary Judgment

In a recent decision, this Court undertook a comparative analysis of the
requirements of UT. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions for dismissal based upon failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, and UT. R. Civ. P. 56 motions for summary
judgment on the pleadings. Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App. 10, 155 P.3d 893. It opined as
follows:
If a court considers material outside the pleadings in deciding a rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must convert the motion into one for
summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). This rule 12(b) conversion
process includes giving the parties reasonable notice and opportunity to
submit all pertinent summary judgment materials for the court's
consideration. See id; Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389,
1391 (Utah 1996); Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d
191, 193 (Utah 1977). The notice and opportunity to submit requirements
are especially important with respect to the party against whom judgment is
entered. See Strand, 561 P.2d at 193 (stating that the opportunity for the
non-moving party to submit rule 56 material is particularly important). Our
rules provide that complaints and answers constitute pleadings. See Utah R.
Civ. P. 7(a) (including replies to counterclaims and answers to crossclaims, as well as third-party complaints and answers, within the definition
of pleadings). A matter outside the pleadings "include[s] any written or oral
evidence ... which ... substantiat [es] ... and does not merely reiterate what
is said in the pleadings." Oakwood VilL, 2004 UT 101 at f 12, 104 P.3d
1226 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quotations and
citation omitted).
Id. at f 8. In Tuttle, the Defendant submitted copies with its memorandum respecting the
dismissal issue of a federal judgment involving the parties. Id. at Tf9. Because this
judgment was not considered a "pleading" pursuant to UT. R. Civ. P. 7(a), this Court

determined that the trial court should have converted the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal into a
Rule 56 summary judgment motion, with adequate notice and reasonable opportunity to
respond accordingly given to the parties. Id. This Court determined that it was required
to reverse the trial court's dismissal in Tuttle since "[n]either party knew until the end of
the hearing that the trial court would grant what it termed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings." Id. at f 10. This Court stated that it could only affirm the trial court's
dismissal if it found, independent of material submitted outside the pleadings, that the
plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id.
This position is in accordance with this Court's standard of review in this matter.
"Whether the district court properly granted the motion to dismiss is 'a question of law,
[which] we review for correctness, giving no deference to the decision of the trial court.'"
Gunn v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 2007 UT App. 4, ^6, 155 P.3d 113, citing Peterson v.
Delta Air Lines. Inc.. 2002 UT App. 56, f7, 42 P.3d 1253. "We will only affirm a trial
court's grant of a motion to dismiss ' "where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff
would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support
of its claims." ' " Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shores, 2006 UT 393, f 14, 147 P.3d 456,
citing Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co.. 790 P.2d 107, 109-10 (Utah App. 1990)(quoting
Arrow Indus. V. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). "In reviewing
trial court order granting motion to dismiss for failure to state claim on which relief can
be granted, appellate court must accept material allegations of complaint as true, and
appellate court will affirm trial court's ruling only if it clearly appears complainant can
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prove no set of facts in support of his or her claims." Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2006 UT App
340,1(6, 143 P.3d 295.
On May 24, 2007, Smith filed his Complaint in the above-captioned matter. In
said Complaint, Smith alleged that, on or about June 6, 1999, the City initiated SID-98,
which was a conglomeration of six (6) projects, each independent from the others and
with the assessments within each project segregated and grouped according to the
properties which purported to benefit from the work done within each project.

See,

Complaint at p. 2. One of the projects included in SID-98 was the flood control structure,
the construction materials of which are at issue in this Inverse Action. Id. The flood
control structure herein was designed and engineered by Bowen Collins & Associates, a
Salt Lake City engineering firm hired by the City, and the estimated cost was in excess of
two million dollars ($2,000,000.00). Id.
Sometime during the Fall of 1999, the City entered into a contract for the
construction of the flood control structure with Schmidt, who was the successful bidder
of the project. Id. The contract identified the City as the owner of the real property
where the flood control structure was to be built; however, the property was then owned
by the Smith parties herein. Id. The contract provided that Schmidt could enter the
property and construct the project using materials located on Smith's properties. Id.
Schmidt was ultimately paid $819,361.15 on the contract, with total cost of the
construction according to the City at $915,753.54 (including interest on interim
warrants). Id. On April 24, 2001, the City enacted an ordinance assessing plaintiffs

property. Id. The Complaint was timely and properly filed in accordance with the
provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. §17A3-330.
Pursuant to this Court's holding in Sorensen, supra, the material allegations of the
Complaint must be accepted by this Court as true in determining this issue. Ibid, at f6.
The trial court ultimately determined that Smith was not entitled to compensation for the
materials on the condemnation property since Smith had received compensation in the
Condemnation Action for the property condemned, which would include any rock, dirt,
etc. on the real estate. See, Addendum "A" at p. 3. This determination was based upon a
judgment from a separate action involving the parties and the affidavit of Kit Wareham.
Similar to Tuttle, supra, neither the judgment from the Condemnation Action nor the
Wareham affidavit could be considered a "pleading" pursuant to UT. R. CIV. P. 7(a) and
are thus matters "outside the pleadings" not appropriately determined under Rule
12(b)(6) for dismissal. Having considered such in its determination, the trial court was
required to properly convert the matter to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56.
The trial court additionally erroneously concluded that, as it pertained to the
allegations in the Complaint as to materials taken from the property adjacent to the
condemned property, Smith was required to present support by affidavit or citation to the
record as to this argument. See, Addendum "A" at p. 3. Such evidentiary requirements
are unnecessary in a dismissal motion, however, since the allegations contained in the
Complaint are presumed true as it pertains to dismissals. See, Sorensen, supra. While
such evidentiary requirements are necessary in a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment,
the trial court never undertook a conversion of the City's dismissal motion and failed to
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properly put Smith on notice of such to allow adequate opportunity to present evidence
accordingly.
Similar to Turtle, the trial court herein waited until the entry of the Dismissal
Order before notifying Smith that they were subjected to a summary judgment motion.
Smith was not allowed adequate notice, opportunity to defend against a Rule 56 motion,
nor even opportunity to object to such. The trial court improperly determined the matter
under Rule 56 without undertaking the necessary conversion and notifying the parties.
Hence, under this Court's prior holdings, it is required to reverse the dismissal absent
independent finding that Smith has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. As argued further below, Smith has an actionable cause against the City in this
matter and dismissal was inappropriate.
B.

Smith Has An Actionable Cause Against The City Due To The Fact
That The SID Is Invalid As It Was Constructed On Private Property.

UTAH CONST. ART.

I § 22 states, "[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged

for public use without just compensation." The Utah Supreme Court held that, "[o]ur
Constitution and statute require compensation to be first made for private property taken
for public use; and, where property is entered upon and appropriated to public use
without complying with the law, the owner may waive the tort and sue for his just
compensation." Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 46 Utah 203, 148 P.
439, 441, (Utah 1914.) "Under Utah law, a property owner may bring an inverse
condemnation action whenever private property is taken or damaged for public use
without a formal exercise of the State's eminent domain power." Bateman v. City of

West Bountiful 89 F.3d 704, 708 C.A.10 (Utah),1996), citing Farmers New World Life
v. Bountiful Citv. 803 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1990.)
In State ex rel. State Road Commission v. District Court, the Court stated that
"taking" is "any substantial interference with private property which destroys or
materially lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in
any substantial degree abridged or destroyed." Ibid, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502, 506
(1937) (quoting Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Rv. Co., 28 Utah 201, 211, 77 P. 849,
852 (1904); see Hampton v. State Road Comm'n, 21 Utah 2d 342, 347, 445 P.2d 708,
711-12 (1968). The Utah Supreme Court set forth the test for the standard of just
compensation in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arthur, 10 Utah 2d 306, 352 P.2d 693 (1960):
The standard of what is "just compensation" in the ordinary case is the
market value of the property taken, that is what a willing buyer would pay
to a willing seller. . . .Arthur recognized, however, that on occasion there is
little or no possibility of sale on an open market, and consequently no
market value in the usual sense of that term or more precisely by employing
the usual test of a willing buyer and willing seller to determine market
value. See also Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 122 Utah 431,
250 P.2d 938 (1952). This Court in Arthur then stated the rule applicable to
a situation where there is little or no possibility of open market sales as
follows:. . . (I)ts value could be ascertained from the opinions of wellinformed persons as to what reasonable purchasers would be willing to pay
for the property on the open market should they find it suitable for their
purposes
(Emphasis added.)
Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. Utah Wool Pulling Co., 566 P.2d 1240, 1242, (Utah 1977.)
Although the Smith deeded a portion of the property to the City in 2005, they
continue to be the owners of the remaining portions of the property. In Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co v. SID No. 222 of Douglas County, 281 N.W. 2d 922 (1979) citing
McQuillin Mun. Corp. s. 38.179(3rd ed.), it states, "It is beyond question that in order to
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render an assessment for improvements valid, the improvements may be constructed only
on land in which the public has title or at least a valid easement, citing McQuillin Mun.
Corp. s. 38J79(3rd ed.) citing City of McCook v. Red Willow County, 133 Neb. 380,
275 N.W. 396. See, also, 14 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed.), s 38.179, p.
448.
In the instant matter, the City removed and used rocks and materials that were
contained on the subject property to build the flood control structure. However, at the
time of construction, the City had not commenced condemnation proceedings on the
subject property and at the present time the City has still not commenced condemnation
proceedings for the rocks and materials that were removed from the subject property. In
order for the City to be entitled to the rocks and materials from the property they must
commence a separate condemnation action for these materials. The rocks and materials
were and still are private property of Smith as no condemnation proceedings have ever
been commenced for the materials. In using the rocks to build the flood control structure,
the City has violated Smith's rights under the Utah Constitution by taking private
property without just compensation to Smith. As private property has been removed
without just compensation Smith is within his right to sue for such compensation.
In this matter, Smith has received no form of just compensation from the City for
the rocks and materials that were removed from the subject property. As stated in the
UTAH

CONST. ART. I § 22, Smith is entitled to just compensation, to be determined under

the standards mentioned supra, for the materials the City used and removed from the
Smith's private property in the construction of the flood control structure.
In his deposition, Nichols testified that he entered into a verbal agreement with
Schmidt prior to the construction of the Structure. (Frank Nichols Deposition, pp. 75-76).
Without an evidentiary hearing on this matter, the trial court could not have possibly
ascertained that the City did not use any materials from Smith's property in the
construction of the Structure. Clearly, the contradictory affidavits made by Nichols and
Wareham warrant further inquiry by the trial court. Therefore, the trial court erred by
granting the City's Motion to Dismiss and its Dismissal Order should be reversed.
At the time the SID was constructed, it was on private property rendering it
invalid. At the time the City built the Structure and used the material and rocks located
on the Property and adjacent properties, no condemnation proceedings or condemnation
action had commenced. The land was still private property at that time, owned by Smith.
Since then, the Property has been deeded to the City under a mediation agreement in the
Condemnation Action between the parties, however, the Condemnation Action has not
yet concluded and does not include the materials taken in or before 2000 from the
Property or the adjacent properties. No condemnation proceedings have commenced
regarding the materials from the Property or the adjacent properties and therefore, those
materials and rocks are still private property.
Thus, the SID in this matter is void ab initio for having been constructed on
private property. An SID built on private property, such as in the instant matter, is
invalid. See, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co v. SID No. 222 of DouglasCounty, 281
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N.W. 2d 922 (1979) citing McQuillin Mun. Corp. s. 38.179 (3rd ed.). The Property was
not owned by the City and the City had not commenced condemnation proceedings at the
time the Structure was constructed. The City entered the Property without any color of
title in either the materials or the Property upon which they were constructing the
Structure.
When improvements are performed to property for public use, special taxes and
assessments are levied against the subject property to pay for the improvements in the
district. See, UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A3-303(l)(a) In the instant matter, the City caused
assessments to be made against property in the district, including Smith's adjacent
properties, for a portion of the costs of the improvements. The materials used were not
setoff against the assessments. In effect, the seizure of Smith's materials caused a levied
assessment against the adjacent properties, which were not setoff for the value of the
materials.
Smith in his action for compensation of the materials utilized in the Structure, is
entitled to a setoff for the value of the materials used before any further amount of tax is
imposed. See, UTAH CODE ANN§ 78-34-9(4)(b). Therefore, the SID in this matter was
not only invalid for being constructed on private property, but the assessment levied
against the property for the SID failed to take into consideration the materials obtained
from Smith for the construction of the flood structure. Smith's materials should be
considered "payment in kind" for the SID assessments. Smith is entitled to a setoff of the
SID assessments for the materials removed from the Property and adjacent properties in
or before 2000, since said materials were, and still are, Smith's private property.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78-34-10 states that, "[t]he court, jury or referee must hear

such legal evidence as may be offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and
thereupon must ascertain and assess:

(1) the value of the property sought to be

condemned and all improvements thereon appertaining to the realty, and of each and
every separate estate or interest therein; and if it consists of different parcels, the value of
each parcel and of each estate or interest therein shall be separately assessed." As is
stated in UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-10(1) the court must hear evidence in condemnation
proceedings and assess the value of the property and any improvements made to the
property and the court must do this separately for each estate or interest contained within
the property. As it must be done for each interest in the property this includes materials
located on the property. Therefore, it is the duty of the court to determine the value of the
rocks and materials that were removed from Smith's private property to help construct
the flood control structure and to determine the value of every parcel, material, or interest
of property that is at issue in this action.
The trial court erred by not proceeding to trial to resolve the evidentiary issue in
this case. Nichols and Wareham both submitted affidavits to the trial court. As sworn to
by Nichols in his affidavit, the same court in the above captioned case presided in the
Condemnation Action, which judgment was understood not to include the materials being
sued for in the instant case. {Affidavit of Frank Nichols, p. 3). Wareham's affidavit does
not indicate anything on this point, but simply attempts to lay responsibility with Schmidt
under a contract not provided to the trial court in this matter, and bar itself from liability
under the same unknown provisions. Clearly, this conveyed a need for the trial court to
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inquire further so as to ascertain the truth of the matter. {Affidavit of Kit Wareham, pp. 12).
The trial court in its Dismissal Order stated that Smith's response to the City's
Motion to Dismiss Smith included a Statement of Facts "unsupported by any affidavit or
citation to the record." (Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 2). However,
in Smith's reply to the City's Motion to Dismiss, an affidavit accompanying it from
Nichols clearly supports its Statement of Facts, which is directly in line with responding
to a dismissal motion. (Affidavit of Frank Nichols, pp. 1-4.) The trial court should have
proceeded to trial or converted the matter to a motion for summary judgment so as to
weigh the affidavits and credibility of the conflicting witnesses. Therefore, the trial court
erred in granting the City's Motion to Dismiss based upon the fact that Smith maintained
an actionable cause against the City for inverse condemnation and its Dismissal Order
should be reversed.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED SMITH'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
UNDER THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS BY FIRST
DENYING A MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE THE CASE WITH A SEPARATE
CAUSE PERTAINING TO THE REAL PROPERTY, THEN DETERMINING
THE UNDERLYING ISSUE BASED UPON THE DETERMINATION IN THAT
SEPARATE CAUSE OF ACTION
UT. CONST. ART.

I § 7 states, "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or

property, without due process of law." UT. R. CIV. P. 42 sets forth as follows:
(a)
Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or
fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any
or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions
consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein
as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay, (a)(1) A motion to

consolidate cases shall be heard by the judge assigned to the first case filed.
Notice of a motion to consolidate cases shall be given to all parties in each
case. The order denying or granting the motion shall be filed in each case.
(a)(2) If a motion to consolidate is granted, the case number of the first case
filed shall be used for all subsequent papers and the case shall be heard by
the judge assigned to the first case. The presiding judge may assign the case
to another judge for good cause, (b) Separate trials. The court in furtherance
of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any
claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate
issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party
claims, or issues.
"Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure gives trial courts discretion to bifurcate
proceedings in appropriate situations." Parker v. Parker, 2000 UT App 30,f 7, 996 P.2d
565. See UT. R. CIV. P. 42. The Utah Supreme Court has determined the following:
Rule 42(b) permits a trial court, "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid
prejudice," to order a separate trial of "any claim" or "any separate issue."
Regardless of convenience, however, an order to bifurcate trial "is an abuse
of discretion if it is unfair or prejudicial to a party" or if "the issues are
[not] clearly separable." Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus., 11 F.3d 957,
964 (10th Cir.1993) (interpreting Fed.R.Civ.P. 42, which is identical to the
Utah rule).
Walker Drug Co.. Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1244 (Utah 1998). Cases can be
consolidated when they "involv[e] a common question of law or fact." Sullivan v.
Sullivan. 2004 UT App 485, % 11, 105 P.3d 963.
In both the Condemnation Action and the Inverse Action, the parties and the issues
were pertaining to the materials and the property itself that was condemned in the
Condemnation Action. Both actions resulted from the City taking private property and
using such property to construct the same structure. The outcome of the Condemnation
Action was relied upon by this Court in adjudicating the Inverse Action in its Dismissal
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Order, claiming that Smith had receive compensation for the materials taken from the
condemned property in the separate Condemnation Action.
The Dismissal Order from which Smith now appeals states in pertinent part:
The Plaintiffs claim for compensation for materials located on the
condemned property and used in the project is denied as failing to state a
claim for which relief may be granted, Plaintiffs having obtained a
decision in the condemnation proceeding and the court having fixed the
value of the property condemned, which would include any rock, dirt, etc.
on the real estate.
{Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 3). With this Dismissal Order in
place, Smith is placed at a disadvantage. Throughout the Condemnation Action (which
not only involved the same parties but also the same trial judge), Smith's counsel reiterated to the trial court that the Condemnation Action was solely for the value of the
real estate, not the materials, which were being sued for in the instant case. {See, Affidavit
of Frank Nichols, p. 2-3). Furthermore, in the instant case, no notice or argument was
given that the materials were being included in the Condemnation Action. Therefore,
Smith was not on notice to defend against the outcome of the Condemnation Action as it
pertains to the materials taken from said property2. Given the trial court's reliance upon
the outcome of the Condemnation Action five (5) months following entry of the order
from said action, Smith was without recourse to appeal the underlying Condemnation
Action in order to defend against the contentions in this action that it included the

2

Neither the arguments made at the trial on the Condemnation Action nor the judgment from said action indicated
to Smith that the compensation ordered therein was for the materials contained on the property. In fact, the judge
refused to hear any evidence pertaining to the materials until compensation for the property itself was determined.
The parties in the Condemnation Action put on only evidence pertaining to valuation of the property, not the
materials taken from the property.

materials taken therefrom in construction of the structure. Such action by the trial court
has severely prejudiced Smith's Due Process rights in this matter.
The trial court inappropriately relied upon the decision in the Condemnation
Action in its Dismissal Order in the instant case, particularly given its refusal in the
Condemnation Action to hear matters pertaining to the materials and its refusal to
consolidate the cases. When coupled with the trial court's reiteration throughout the trial
in the Condemnation Action that it was only considering the real property and not the
materials, the trial court's Dismissal Order has prejudiced Smith. Ultimately, this
Dismissal Order violates Smith's right to due process under the United States and Utah
Constitutions in that Smith was neither put on notice to defend against the Condemnation
Action in this proceeding.
Both the City and Smith indicated to the trial court that they wished to consolidate
the instant matter with the Condemnation Action (Minutes Review Hearing, June 2, 2004,
p. 1). In the docket for the Inverse Action, it is clear that this action trailed the
Condemnation Action and was waiting for a determination to be made in that case.
(Minutes Review Hearing, July 19, 2005, p.l; Minutes Status Hearing, March 8, 2005, p.
I; Minutes Status Hearing, May 10, 2005, p.l; Minutes Order to Show Cause, August 26,
2003, p. 1). Based on the record, it is apparent that, although the trial court did not see fit
to consolidate the cases, it still relied on the outcome of the Condemnation Action to
issue its Dismissal Order in the Inverse Action.
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III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY RELYING ON
WAREHAM'S AFFIDAVIT IN ITS DISMISSAL ORDER WHEN SAID
AFFIDAVIT RELIED ON A CONTRACT NOT IN EVIDENCE.
This Court may take notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights. State v.
Hall 946 P.2d 712, 715 (Utah App. 1997) citing State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah
1989) (quotations omitted). To establish plain error, defendant must show that, "(0 t a ] n
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). "If any one of these
requirements is not met, plain error is not established." Id. at 1209. UTAH R. EVIDENCE
103(d) states, "[n]othing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting
substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court."
UT. R. EVID. 1002 states that, "[t]o prove the content of a writing, recording, or
photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as
otherwise provided in these rules or by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of this
State or by Statute." (Emphasis added.) Rule 1002 has frequently been referred to as the
"best evidence rule" by this and other courts. See, Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99,
17 P.3d 1110. The Utah Supreme Court explained the rule's purpose as follows:
The purpose of the best evidence rule is primarily to prevent mistake or
fraud. Citing 29A Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 1049, at 511 (1994); 32A C.J.S.
Evidence § 1061 (1996); 6 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger,
Wienstein's Federal Evidence § 1002.03 (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed.
Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997); 4 Wigmore on Evidence § 1179, at 417
(James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. 1972). Therefore, when the content of a
document is material to the matter to be proved, the original writing must
be produced unless it is unavailable due to an exception and its absence is
not attributable to the fault of the party seeking to use it as proof of the

contents therein. See Am.Jur.2d supra, § 1049, at 510; C.J.S. supra, §§
1057, 1059.
Id. atfl37-38.
On October 3, 2006, Wareham swore in an affidavit that he contracted with
Schmidt to construct the SID in the instant matter. Affidavit of Kit Wareham, Cedar City
Engineer, p. 1. Schmidt was hired to construct the Structure within the SID. Id. The
construction of the Structure required rip-rap lining of the Structure's channel and rock
lining for the dam and basin. Id. at 2. Wareham swore that the contract with Schmidt
required Schmidt to provide the rock and other materials needed to construct the
Structure and that, to the best of his knowledge, Schmidt did so. Id.
In the Dismissal Order in this matter, the trial court acknowledged the filing of the
motion to strike and the responses thereto, indicating that the City had supported its
position with the Wareham9s affidavit. See, Dismissal Order at pp. 2-3. Specifically, the
trial court indicated that, ". . .Wareham claims that the contractor on the project was
obligated to provide the materials and, in fact, did provide 'all the rocks used as materials
in the project that were not removed from the approximately 7.5 acre flood control basin
constructed as part of the project.' That claim is unrebutted by any affidavit or citation to
the record except the allegations of the Complaint and Plaintiffs' arguments against
dismissal." Id. at p. 3. The trial court then denied the claim respecting compensation for
materials located on the condemned property as failing to state a claim for which relief
may be granted, referencing Smith's compensation in the Condemnation Action as
inclusive of the materials taken from the condemned property. Id. As it pertained to
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materials taken from adjacent properties, the trial court found that the claim was
unsupported by any affidavit or citation to the record, stating that ". . .Plaintiffs may not
simply rely on the allegations in their complaint or their argument, unsupported by any
affidavit or citation to the record, in opposing Defendant's motion for summary
judgement [sic] as to that claim." Id. The trial court then granted "Defendant's motion
for summary judgment of dismissal" as to the materials removed from adjacent property
and dismissed the claim. Id.
In the instant case, the trial court committed plain error relying upon the
submission of Wareham's affidavit with the City's Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to
Defendant's Motion to Strike. (Record, Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's
Motion to Strike, pp. 1-6). Wareham's affidavit relies on a contract that has not been
submitted into evidence and is not in the record. The trial court, in issuing the Dismissal
Order, cannot rely on a contract not in the record nor can it require Smith to rebut it
absent proof that it exists and that the terms as interpreted by Wareham are correct. The
City should have been required to produce the contract in support of Wareham's
affidavit. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting the City's Motion to Dismiss and its
Dismissal Order should be reversed.
Furthermore, the error exists due to the trial court relying on an affidavit that in
turn relied on a contract not in evidence or included in the record. Dunn at 1208. There is
no evidence pertaining to this matter in the record other than Wareham's affidavit, so this
Court is not in a position to be able to rely upon Wareham's interpretation of its
provisions in its independent review. This error should have been obvious to the trial

court due to the fact that Wareham swore to the terms of a contract that the trial court did
not have in its possession to review personally. Id. In a situation where the City was
attempting to place their liability on Schmidt pursuant to a contract between the City and
Schmidt, a motion to join an indispensible party to the action would have been the
appropriate avenue to take rather than just boldly attesting to the provisions of a contract
and claiming that someone else is liable. The error is harmful because the Inverse Action
would have succeeded on its merits had the proceedings continued. Id. Therefore, the
Dismissal Order should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, based upon die foregoing, Smith respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the Dismissal Order in this matter and take any such further action as this Court
deems necessary.
DATED this >H uf Jk&ayJxo 2007.

William L. Bernard
Attorney for David J. Smith
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^iSSS 0 7 " COURT
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COVRJ^JP^kgOUNTY'
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IRON, STATE O F U T A i r ^ DeP"ty Clerk

ESTATE OF SALLIE SMITH et al.,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.
CEDAR CITY, A MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION,

Case No. 010500355
JUDGE: G. MICHAEL WESTFALL

Defendant.
On or about May 24, 2001 Plaintiffs commenced this action by filing a Complaint in
which three causes of action are asserted against the Defendant. In their first cause of
action the Plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to be compensated for property
condemned on which a flood control project was constructed and for materials used by
Defendant in the construction of that flood control project. They seek to have the amount
to which they claim entitlement under that cause of action set off as a credit against the
Defendant's special improvement district assessment for their property. Elsewhere in the
Complaint the Plaintiffs claim that the materials used in the construction of the project
were taken from "the [Plaintiffs'] property." (Paragraph 8 of the Plaintiffs' Complaint)
While Plaintiffs' property includes the property where the project was constructed,
Plaintiffs' property also includes adjacent land. Therefore, the First Cause of Action of
Plaintiffs' Complaint includes a claim for materials taken from the property condemned in
Case No. 010500168 and property taken from adjacent property as well.
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The Plaintiffs' Second and Third Causes of Action, challenging the special
improvement assessment, were dismissed by agreement of the parties in an Order entered
June 9,2006.
In their Trial Brief, filed July 31, 2006, Plaintiffs identify their claims against
Defendant as, among things, claims for materials taken from the condemned property and
from the "surrounding areas." Plaintiffs also argue that the special improvement district is
invalid.
Defendant filed a "Response to Plaintiffs' Trial Brief and Motion to Dismiss" on
August 25, 2006. In that Motion Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs should not be
compensated for the materials on the real property in addition to the value of the real
property condemned, that Plaintiffs challenge to the special improvement district should
be dismissed because the Plaintiffs have not alleged compliance with the requirements for
challenge to that special improvement district and that the Plaintiffs claims should be
dismissed because of estoppel, claim preclusion and issue preclusion. It would appear that
the Defendant intends to have this considered a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim as to part of this proceeding and a motion for summary judgement as to others.
Plaintiffs filed a response to the Defendant's Motion on September 12, 2006, and
included a Statement of Facts unsupported by any affidavit or citation to the record.
Defendant moved to strike portions of that Statement of Facts, to which Plaintiffs filed a
response.
On October 3, 2006 the Defendant filed a Reply relating to the Motion to Strike, and
supports that Reply with the Affidavit of Kit Wareham, Cedar City Engineer, in which

Page 2 of 4

Mr. Wareham claims that the contractor on the project was obligated to provide the
materials and, in fact, did provide "all of the rocks used as material in the project that
were not removed from the approximately 7.5 acre flood control basin constructed as part
of the project." That claim is unrebutted by any affidavit or citation to the record except
the allegations of the Complaint and Plaintiffs' arguments against dismissal.
The Plaintiffs' claim to compensation for materials located on the condemned
property and used in the project is denied as failing to state a claim for which relief may
be granted, Plaintiffs having obtained a decision in the condemnation proceeding and the
court having fixed the value of the property condemned, which would include any rock,
dirt, etc. on the real estate.
Although Plaintiffs claim that materials were taken from real estate adjacent to the
condemned property, that claim is unsupported by any affidavit or citation to the record.
Plaintiffs may not simply rely on the allegations in their complaint or their argument,
unsupported by any affidavit or citation to the record, in opposing Defendant's motion for
summary judgement as to that claim. Therefore, Defendant's motion for summary
judgment of dismissal as to Plaintiffs for materials removed from property adjacent to the
condemned property, is granted and this claim is dismissed.
Plaintiffs argue that the special improvement district is invalid. The court was of the
impression that challenges to the validity of the special improvement district were
resolved by the Order entered June 9, 2006. However, neither party has cited that Order
for that proposition so the court will consider Plaintiffs' claims in that regard.
The court grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' challenge to the
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special improvement district assessment because the Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to allege
compliance with the statutory provisions cited by the Defendant.
The court having granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for the reasons stated
hereinabove, the court does not address the remaining arguments in the Defendant's
Motion.
DATED this 14th day of April, 2007.
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